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55 
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER ABROAD:  
PUTTING JUSTICE INTO LEGAL REASONING 
JAMES R. MAXEINER  
ABSTRACT 
Americans are taking new interest in legal reasoning. Thinking Like a 
Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning by Professor Frederick 
Schauer suggests why. According to Schauer, American legal methods 
often require decision-makers “to do something other than the right 
thing.”1 There has got to be a better way. 
Now comes a book that offers Americans opportunities to look into a 
world where legal methods help decision-makers do the right thing. 
According to Reinhard Zippelius in his newly translated Introduction to 
German Legal Methods, German legal methods help decision makers 
resolve legal problems “in a just and equitable manner.”2  
This Article sets out what good legal methods do: help decide legal 
problems justly. It poses the puzzle: why does Schauer say legal methods 
challenge rather than support doing the right thing, when Zippelius does 
not? Relying on Schauer himself, the Article suggests an answer: neglect 
of legislation and law application and fixation on appellate law-making. It 
shows how German legal methods as described by Zippelius help decision 
makers to do the right thing. 
 
 
  James R. Maxeiner, J.D., LL.M., Ph.D. in Law (under Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Fikentscher, 
Munich), Associate Professor of Law, Associate Director, Center for International and Comparative 
Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank Kirk W. Junker, Mathias Reimann 
and P. Matthew Roy for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Mistakes are my 
own. I would also like to thank the University of Baltimore for providing a summer research stipend 
that supported it. I dedicate it to the memory of Philip A. Maxeiner, Washington University, B.S.B.A., 
1934; University Student President, 1935; Juris Doctor, 1936; member of the St. Louis Law Review, 
1935–1936 (predecessor of the Washington University Law Quarterly; and active supporter and 
benefactor of the Washington University School of Law until his death in 1996. The author is 
consultant to Common Good, and in particular, to their Start Over initiative. This Article predates that 
relationship and gives only the views of the author. 
 1. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING 212 (2009) 
 2. REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS 13 (Kirk W. Junker & 
P. Matthew Roy, 2008). 
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INTRODUCTION 
―[R]ule-based and precedent based decision making often require 
legal decision-makers to do something other than the right thing 
. . . .‖ 
—Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: 
A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning
3
 
―The law must regulate human behavior in such a way that . . . the 
legal problems that arise in a society are resolved in a just and 
equitable manner.‖ 
—Reinhold Zippelius,  
Introduction to German Legal Methods
4
 
The American public should be distressed that in his new book, 
Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Professor 
Frederick Schauer teaches law students that American legal methods often 
require decision-makers ―to do something other than the right thing.‖5 It 
should find disturbing that Schauer writes about legal reasoning without 
using the word justice. Should not thinking like a lawyer have something 
to do with realizing justice? 
Elsewhere it does. 
In Europe, Professor Reinhard Zippelius in his Introduction to German 
Legal Methods, first published in German in 1971 and now translated into 
English for the first time, teaches law students that legal reasoning helps 
decision-makers resolve legal problems ―in a just and equitable manner.‖6 
 
 
 3. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 212. 
 4. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 13. 
 5. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 212. No other scholar in the United States today is more identified 
with rules and legal reasoning than is Schauer. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Introduction to KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011); FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, 
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN 
LAW AND IN LIFE (1991). See generally Linda Meyer, Editor’s Introduction to RULES AND 
REASONING: ARTICLES IN HONOUR OF FRED SCHAUER (Linda Meyer ed., 1999) (introducing various 
essays analyzing and even critiquing Schauer‘s legal reasoning methods). If the comments with which 
Harvard University Press introduced Schauer‘s book are any indication, Schauer‘s book may become 
an American standard. Professor Sanford F. Levinson describes it as ―the best available introduction to 
legal reasoning.‖ Judge Richard A. Posner counts the book ―as comprehensive, thorough, and 
sophisticated an introduction to legal reasoning as it is a lucid one. All the bases are covered . . . .‖ It 
lays out ―the entire range of legal reasoning techniques.‖ 
 6. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 13.  
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The book‘s German original has been a standard student text for more than 
forty years.
7
 
Although legal reasoning is not a topic of public debate in the United 
States, its failures are. American dissatisfaction with civil justice has been 
a recurrent theme in American history since the earliest days of the 
republic.
8
 As the country developed a modern commercial system it tried 
and failed to develop a modern system of legal methods.
9
 Today it limps 
along with third rate methods rooted in a pre-industrial past.
10
 
There are many law reform organizations and many proposals for 
reform. Commonly they focus on specific niches of the American legal 
system, such as tort reform, representation for the poor, consumer 
protection, caps on malpractice recoveries, loser-pays, and limitations on 
punitive damages. 
Law reform is a never-ending story because Americans implement 
substantive law reforms with dysfunctional methods. America has interest 
in reform and has ideas for reform, but does not have legal methods that 
could make those reforms work well.  
Recently the law reform organization, The Common Good, announced 
a new initiative, ―Start Over,‖ that is directed to the legal system as a 
whole.
11
 It deplores how Americans are ―drowning in law.‖12 They live in 
―fear of possible lawsuits.‖13 Their hands are tied ―by laws made by 
political leaders who are long dead.‖14 Government is paralyzed because 
legislation tries to ―calibrate correct choices in advance . . . [when] it is 
 
 
 7. The first edition appeared under the title EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE 
(1st ed. 1971); the most recent is under the title JURISTISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE: EINE EINFÜHRUNG 
(10th ed. 2006). The other classic students‘ text is KARL ENGISCH, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE 
DENKEN (1st ed. 1956; 10th ed. by Thomas Würtenberger & Dirk Otto, 2005). The classic academic 
text is KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1st ed. 1960; 6th ed. 1991; 4th 
condensed study ed. with Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, 2009). The global comparative work is WOLFGANG 
FIKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG (5 vols. 1975–1977).  
 8. See JAMES R. MAXEINER, GYOOHO LEE & ARMIN WEBER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL 
JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 260–65 (2011) [hereinafter MAXEINER, FAILURES]. 
 9. Id. at 263–65. 
 10. See id. at 260–65. 
 11. About Common Good, COMMON GOOD, http://www.commongood.org/pages/about-us (last 
visited May 2, 2012) (―Our Start Over campaign, launched in May 2011, aims to influence the 2012 
election by organizing public support for structural overhaul of government and law. Only people, not 
rules, make things happen.‖). 
 12. The Problem: Drowning in Law, COMMON GOOD, http://www.commongood.org/pages/the-
problem (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 13. The Problem: Drowning in Law, Legal Fear, COMMON GOOD, http://www.commongood.org/ 
pages/legal-fear (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 14. The Problem: Drowning in Law, Democracy by Dead People, COMMON GOOD, http://www. 
commongood.org/pages/democracy-by-dead-people (last visited May 2, 2012). 
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beyond human capacity to foresee every possible circumstance . . . .‖15 
Laws leave ―no room for humans in charge to make essential choices;‖16 
laws ―have taken away people‘s authority to assert good values.‖17 Start 
Over sees the failings in the system itself and not in any single substantive 
manifestation. 
Start Over recognizes that incremental change is not enough. Where 
nineteenth century reformers chose to work ―with old materials and after 
the old fashions,‖18 Start Over promotes real change. Starting over with 
something new is daring. America has over one million lawyers. They are 
invested in old ways of doing things. Yet few of them would deny that 
those old ways do not work well for most people. It is time that they do 
their part to fulfill the national pledge of ―liberty and justice for all.‖19 
Elsewhere in the world, there are legal systems that work better. American 
reformers need not imagine unproven methods; they can study methods 
proven to work.  
This translation of Zippelius‘ Introduction to German Legal Methods 
begins to make it possible for monolingual Americans to look at how one 
such system actually works.
20
 The German system works well; it has long 
been admired around the world.
21
  
 
 
 15. The Problem: Drowning in Law, Government Paralysis, COMMON GOOD, http://www. 
commongood.org/pages/government-paralysis (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. The Problem: Drowning in Law, Loss of Personal Responsibility, COMMON GOOD, http:// 
www.commongood.org/pages/loss-of-personal-responsibility (last visited May 2, 2012). 
 18. B.R. Curtis, N.J. Lord & R.A. Chapman, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO 
REVISE AND REFORM THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), 
reprinted in 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 149, 159 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879); see also James R. Maxeiner, 
Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 
517, 541, 559–66 (2006) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy]. 
 19. See The Pledge of Allegiance, 4 U.S.C. § 4. The Pledge of Allegiance was first published in 
National School Celebration of Columbus Day: The Official Programme, THE YOUTH‘S COMPANION, 
Sept. 8, 1892, at 446. 
 20. In the past Americans interested in legal methods outside the common law had few learning 
opportunities in English. Professor Kirk Junker is changing that in Carolina Academic Press‘ new 
series Comparative Legal Thinking Series. Professor Junker‘s goal is to enable English-speaking 
readers to ―attain the unique inside view of the civil law student.‖ Another title already available in the 
series is ANTONIO LORDI & GUIDO ALPA, WHAT IS PRIVATE LAW? (2010). See also EVA STEINER, 
FRENCH LEGAL METHODS (2002) (description of French legal methods from English perspective). 
 21. See, e.g., MAXEINER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 8–9; LAW—MADE IN GERMANY (2nd ed. 
2012), available at http://www.lawmadeingermany.de; DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZEßRECHT UND SEINE 
AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF ANDERE RECHTSORDNUNGEN (Walther J. Habscheid ed., 1991); John H. 
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV 823 (1985); FREDERICK 
FRANK BLACHLY & MIRIAM EULALIE OATMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
GERMANY (Brookings Inst. 1928); Frederick William Maitland, The Making of the German Civil Code 
in 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 484 (Fisher ed., 1911); Roscoe 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/3
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In Part I, I set out what good legal methods do: help decide legal 
problems justly. In Part II I pose the puzzle: why does Schauer say legal 
methods challenge rather than support doing the right thing, when 
Zippelius does not? Relying on Schauer himself, I suggest an answer: 
neglect of legislation and law application and fixation on appellate law-
making. In Part III I show how German legal methods as described by 
Zippelius help decision makers to do the right thing. 
In this Article, my goal is to raise Americans‘ awareness of foreign 
legal methods using the book by Zippelius. I encourage Americans to not 
dismiss civil law methods, but to find in them ideas proven to work.
22
 I am 
not, however, attempting a comparative study of legal methods.  
 
 
Pound, The Causes of the Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 
395, 397 (1906) (describing ―the wonderful mechanism of modern German judicial administration‖). 
For an exhaustive listing of contemporary Anglo-American reactions to the foundational German laws 
from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, see MARCIS DITTMANN, DAS BÜRGERLICHE 
GESETZBUCH AUS SICHT DES COMMON LAW: DAS BGB UND ANDERE KODIFIKATIONEN DER 
KAISERZEIT IM URTEIL ZEITGENÖSSISCHER ENGLISCHER UND ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHER JURISTEN 
(2001).  
 22. Justice Scalia, are you listening? See Ethics in America: 8. Truth on Trial, recorded February 
13, 1988 (PBS television broadcast Feb. 13, 1988) (hosting Justice Antonin Scalia as a panelist), 
available at http://www.learner.org/resources/series81.html?pop=yes&pid=198. On the panel, Justice 
Scalia argued: 
The only alternative [to the adversary system] is to go to the inquisitorial system and have an 
investigating judge. And then you are going to win or lose depending on how good a judge 
you happen to have gotten. At least when you pick your lawyer, you know that if he‘s bad, 
it‘s your fault. 
Id. at 53:30. 
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I. 
 
The Young American (popular schoolbook 1843)
23
 
It is elementary learning that law seeks justice. In the middle of the 
nineteenth century Americans learned this from civics textbooks such as 
the one illustrated here.
24
 ―To establish justice,‖ it taught, ―is indeed the 
great object of all good government.‖25 It cited the preamble of our 
Constitution, to ―establish justice,‖ as the object of the nation, second only 
to creating a more perfect union itself.
26
 It instructed students that civil 
 
 
 23. S.G. GOODRICH, THE YOUNG AMERICAN: OR BOOK OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW; SHOWING 
THEIR HISTORY, NATURE AND NECESSITY 23 (3d ed. 1843).  
 24. See DANIEL ROSELLE, SAMUEL GRISWOLD GOODRICH, CREATOR OF PETER PARLEY, A 
STUDY OF HIS LIFE AND WORK 1 (1968). Goodrich was phenomenally successful as a writer of books 
for youths; he authored the Peter Parley books. See id. 
 25. GOODRICH, supra note 23, at 174. 
 26. Id. at 173 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.). 
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justice consists of applying law to facts, i.e., ―measuring out what a man 
may claim according to the laws of the land.‖27  
Laws are general rules that govern society. Sometimes these rules 
determine outcomes. Other times they grant people authority to determine 
outcomes on their own. Legal methods are the way that legal systems 
apply general rules of substantive law to specific cases. Sometimes they 
direct what outcomes will be. Other times, however, they structure how 
decision-makers acting on their own authority are to determine outcomes. 
Legal methods take law from the initial formulation of rules in 
legislatures or elsewhere through to the final application of rules to 
individual cases. A complete program of legal methods addresses the legal 
system, lawmaking, law-finding, and law-applying.
28
 As used in this 
Article, a legal system is a national organization of law. Lawmaking 
includes legislation, but also judicial or administrative lawmaking. Law-
finding encompasses the interpretation of statutes and precedents; it 
determines the specific rules that decide particular cases. Law-applying 
takes those rules and applies them to facts to decide concrete cases. Law-
applying presupposes a way of fact-finding. Taken together, legal methods 
should facilitate bringing rules and facts together to reach just results.  
Schoolbook learning teaches that legal systems only approximate 
justice. There is tension between justice and law. This tension is at the 
heart of Schauer‘s observation that legal reasoning requires application of 
rules notwithstanding that in particular cases the results may not be the 
best possible decisions. In Schauer‘s world, legal methods exist to take 
decisions away from decision-makers to bind them to decide in accordance 
with less than optimal rules. In Zippelius‘ world, legal methods exist to 
empower decision-makers to reach decisions on their own authority that 
are as fair and just as possible, even if in a some instances rules do not 
comply with this demand and the legal question cannot be solved justly.
29
  
 
 
 27. Id. at 23. 
 28. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 18, at 521–27; James R. Maxeiner: Legal 
Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?, 16 TULANE. J. OF INT‘L & 
COMP. L. 541 (2007) [hereinafter Legal Certainty]; cf. Stefan Vogenauer, Sources of Law and Legal 
Method in Comparative Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 869 (Mathias 
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (―[A] legal method typically answers the following 
questions: (1) What is the style of lawmaking? (2) Who applies and interprets the law? (3) Which 
factors are taken into account in the application and interpretation of the law? (4) How are these 
factors ranked?‖). 
 29. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 14. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
62 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:55 
 
 
 
 
II. LESS THAN THE BEST? SCHAUER‘S THINKING LIKE A LAWYER  
 
 
1996 Internet Newsletter Publication
30
 
Mild rule skepticism is endemic among American jurists. Many, 
perhaps most, contemporary American jurists, accept the aphorism that 
―we are all realists now.‖
31
 By that, they mean, ―we are sophisticated 
professionals; we know that legal decisions have little to do with legal 
rules.‖
32
 Schauer considers this common saying ―almost certainly false.‖33 
In his book, he seeks ―to present a sympathetic treatment of the formal 
side of legal thinking, and thus at least slightly to go against the grain of 
much of twentieth- and twenty-first-century American legal thought.‖34 He 
tells readers: ―[r]ules actually do occupy a large part of law and legal 
reasoning.‖35 He implores them: ―[l]aw may not be all about rules, but it is 
certainly a lot about rules . . . .‖36  
 
 
 30. ―Splash and Grab,‖ SCHNEWS (May 17, 1996), http://www.schnews.org.uk/archive/news74 
.htm.  
 31. Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 247 (2000) (―The slogan 
‗we are all realists now‘ is so well-accepted in North America (in particular in the United States) that 
an unstated working assumption of most legal academics is that judicial explanations of a judgment 
tell us little if anything about why a case was decided as it was.‖). 
 32. Id. 
 33. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 144. 
 34. Id. at xii. 
 35. Id. at 13. 
 36. Id.; cf. James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It, 111 
PENN STATE L. REV. 469 (2009) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law]. 
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Schauer, however, is half-hearted in his defense of legal reasoning; he 
seems to be infected by rule skepticism himself. He acknowledges 
widespread—and perhaps his own—uncertainty when he devotes his first 
chapter to the question ―Is there legal reasoning?‖37 Law may be a lot 
about rules, but Schauer considers the popular conception that law is ―a 
collection of rules written down in a master rulebook‖ to be ―highly 
misleading.‖38 To the contrary, he says that ―straightforward application of 
existing rules [is] ―far removed from the realities of actual practice.‖39 He 
sees that general rules produce poor results in particular cases.
40
 Instead of 
seeing legal methods as opportunities to mediate between rules and facts 
in order to bring better results in particular cases—as solutions in law 
applying—he sees legal reasoning as the problem itself. 
For Schauer, legal thinking requires a choice between a decision 
according to law and doing the right thing. Already on the dust jacket of 
Schauer‘s book we read that legal reasoning is about ―following a rule 
even when it does not produce the best result.‖ By page 7 Schauer has told 
us that ―every one of the dominant characteristics of legal reasoning and 
legal argument can be seen as a route toward reaching a decision other 
than the best all-things considered decision for the matter at hand.‖ A 
Greek chorus repeats the thought throughout his book.
41
  
Schauer says that legal reasoning produces less than the best results 
because of law‘s generality: 
Although disputes, in court and out, involve particular people with 
particular problems engaged in particular controversies, the law 
tends to treat the particulars it confronts as members of larger 
categories. Rather than attempting to reach the best result for each 
controversy in a wholly particularist and contextual way, law‘s goal 
is often to make sure that the outcome for all or at least most of the 
particulars in a given category is the right one.
42
 
 
 
 37. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 1. Nor is he alone; other American authors feel the same. See, e.g., 
STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING, at xiii–xvi (1st ed. 1985). 
The 2007 edition does not include this preface. 
 38. SCHAUER supra note 1, at 103. 
 39. Id. at 13. 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 26, 120. 
 41. It appears over a dozen times. See, e.g., id. at 8, 9, 10, 11, 30, 31, 32, 36, 41, 43, 61, 62, 64, 
and 68.  
 42. Id. at 8. See also Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217, 227–31 
(2004) (discussing the inherent generality of rules); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, 
AND STEREOTYPES 300 (2003) (―Yet not only is generality not, in general, unjust, but justice itself may 
involve considerable components of generality. . . . The good society is one in which generality is not 
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At book‘s end, perhaps exhausted, Schauer tenders a melancholy apology 
for rules:  
At the heart of much of law's use of its characteristic reasoning 
devices is its acceptance of the fact that the best decision is not 
always the best legal decision. In operating in this fashion, law does 
not intend to be perverse. It does, however, intend to take 
institutional values especially seriously, and it does that in the hope 
that in the long run we may be better off with the right institutions 
than we are when everyone simply tries to make the best decision.
43
 
The same issues arise in other legal systems based on rules.
44
 The puzzle is 
to explain why Schauer sees American legal methods as often leading to 
other than the best decisions while Zippelius does not see similar 
consequences for German legal methods.  
Schauer himself, in a recent article, The Failure of the Common Law, 
points us in the direction of an explanation. There he contrasts ―the central 
role of the judge in the lawmaking process‖ in common law countries with 
―the kind of highly precise canonical statement of the law much more 
commonly associated with the civil law . . . .‖45 He poses a puzzle whose 
solution illuminates ours: ―why, even in common law countries, the civil 
law model seems so much in the ascendancy, and the common law model 
seems so much in decline.‖46 
In The Failure of the Common Law, Schauer describes the vision of the 
common law model as starting from broad and vague directives which are 
developed over time by those who are called upon to decide actual 
controversies when they arise.
47
 The laws so made may be avoided or 
modified when the best resolution of the case so requires. The ―constraints 
of precedent [are] understood as secondary to the continuous efforts of 
decision makers to reach the best results for the largest number of cases 
. . . .‖48 
Schauer describes the vision of the civil law to be ―rules set forth in 
advance in an accessible and precise canonical text which is expected to 
 
 
only inescapable, but is also necessary for justice itself.‖). 
 43. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 233. 
 44. See, e.g., ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at xi (―The function of the law in offering solutions 
capable of attaining consensus to questions of justice can also, however, come into conflict with the 
strict obligation of the law.‖). 
 45. Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 765 (2004) 
[hereinafter Schauer, The Failure of Common Law].  
 46. Id. at 772. 
 47. Id. at 770. 
 48. Id. 
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provide a clear, even if not necessarily optimal in every case, resolution of 
the vast majority of legal questions and human controversies.‖49 The hope 
is that subsequent judicial involvement will be minimal.
50
 
As we shall see in Part III that Schauer‘s purposely simplified vision of 
the civil law is only part of the story. It is true that statutes, particularly 
codes, are to provide in advance general answers that fit most situations. It 
is true that in those cases, judicial involvement is minimal. But it is also 
recognized that statutes cannot anticipate every eventuality. Then law is 
not expected to prescribe answers, but to assist decision makers in finding 
solutions to problems. The law does not bind decision makers to non-
optimal decisions; rather it empowers them to decide on their own to reach 
the best possible decisions. 
Schauer solves his puzzle with four explanations. First, common law 
decisionmaking empowers a group of people (i.e., judges) to make socially 
important and largely unconstrained decisions.
51
 Second, common law 
lawmaking occurs in what may be unrepresentative cases.
52
 Third, 
common law judges recognize the costs of excess flexibility and control 
themselves.
53
 Fourth, as societies grow, the importance of the guidance 
function of law becomes greater than the dispute resolution function.
54
  
Schauer‘s explanations have two common threads: concentration on 
judges as lawmakers in litigation (the first three explanations) and 
insufficient attention to those bound trying to follow the law (the fourth 
explanation). More than two decades ago, he identified and said of these 
threads, ―Only in America.‖55 
 
 
 49. Id. at 772. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 777. 
 52. Id. at 778. 
 53. Id. at 779. 
 54. Id. at 781. 
 55. Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1988). ―Only in 
America,‖ is the first sentence of the article. Schauer continued: ―Although judges and judging occupy 
an important place in the institutionalized legal systems of most modern cultures, only in the United 
States could theories of law be so commonly conflated with theories of appellate adjudication.‖ To 
much the same effect, see H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The 
Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 969 (1977). 
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III. JUSTICE THROUGH METHODS:
56
 ZIPPELIUS‘S GERMAN LEGAL METHODS 
57
 
Ius est ars boni et aequi. 
―The law is the art of good order and justice.‖ 
Digests of Justinian, 1st book, 1st section, 1st paragraph
58
 
 We the people of the United States, in order to form a more 
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide 
for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure 
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
Preamble to the U.S. Constitution
59
 
Zippelius sees the tension that Schauer sees between rules and doing 
the right thing, but Zippelius does not see law‘s rules and their application 
as perverting best decisions. To the contrary, Zippelius presents law as 
 
 
 56. The header is borrowed from the title of a book about Karl Engisch, one of the best known 
German legal-methods scholars of the generation prior to Zippelius. See ANDREAS MASCHKE, 
GERECHTIGKEIT DURCH METHODE: ZU KARL ENGISCHS THEORIE DES JURISTISCHEN DENKENS (1993). 
 57. 2 JAMES ROBINSON PLANCHÉ, A CYCLOPÆDIA OF COSTUME OR DICTIONARY OF DRESS 28 
(1878). 
 58. DIG. 1.1.1 (Ulpian, Inst., 1). The English translation is from ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 13 
and is based on the similar German translation of the tenth German edition of Zippelius‘s book, ―Das 
Recht ist die Kunst der guten Ordnung und der Billigkeit.‖ Alan Watson translates the maxim 
differently: ―the law is the art of goodness and fairness.‖ 1 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 1 (Alan Watson ed., 
rev. ed. 2009). The difference in translation underscores the point that, for Zippelius, law is connected 
with good order. 
 59. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
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promoting a ―solution to questions of justice.‖60 Doing justice is a ―task‖ 
of legal methods.
61
  
Although justice is the principal task of law, it is not the only one. 
Zippelius quotes from the beginning of Justinian’s Digests: ―Law is the art 
of good order and justice.‖62 In addition to doing justice, law has the task 
of meeting requirements of legal certainty and, optimally, of adequately 
satisfying societal interests or what Americans call, policy.
63
  
When they can, legislatures ―predetermine‖ questions of justice and 
policy.
64
 They do so in statutes that permit those subject to law to know 
what law requires and to comply with it. When legislatures cannot 
predetermine answers—and that is the case in many matters subject to 
law—what they should do is rationally structure decisions. They can give 
decision makers room to decide on their own authority. Legislatures may 
circumscribe decision makers‘ authority by requiring specific substantive 
criteria, by excluding certain concrete conclusions, by requiring particular 
procedures and by demanding formal justification for decisions. Yet in all 
these instances, law structures decisions without claiming to command 
particular decisions. When law cannot answer definitively what should be 
decided, it can answer who should decide using which criteria subject to 
which process. In short, as Zippelius states, ―the interpretation and 
development of the law are indeed capable of being rationally structured; 
however, they are not completely capable of being rationally 
determined.‖65 
The world of American law that Schauer describes is two-dimensional. 
It presents a decision-maker with a single binary choice: between 
following a rule and doing the right thing. It is the world peculiarly that of 
the American appellate judge, who is presented with facts determined 
below and a legal issue posed by an appellant. The judge makes law 
 
 
 60. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 13.  
 61. Id. at 14.  
 62. Id. (emphasis added). He continues: ―It‘s no accident that this maxim finds itself at the 
beginning of the greatest and most influential work of jurisprudence.‖  
 63. Zippelius variously speaks of ―competing interests‖ and ―societal interests.‖ Policy is a fair 
translation. See JAMES R. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 12 (1986), also available as JAMES R. MAXEINER, RECHTSPOLITIK 
UND METHODEN IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN KARTELLRECHT: EINE VERGLEICHENDE 
BETRACHTUNG (1986) [hereinafter MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS]. Although the term ―legal 
certainty‖ has fallen out of favor in American law, its meaning today is still readily understood. See 
Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 18, at 517–19. 
 64. See ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 16 . 
 65. Id. at xii. 
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intended to bind lower courts. To reach the best result in the one hard case 
may require the judge to make bad law for future cases.  
The world that Zippelius describes is multi-dimensional. In many 
cases, what the law requires is clear. The only issue is a factual one: do the 
instant facts fall under the statutory requirements? If they do, whether the 
result is the best result is not an issue because the legislature has mandated 
the result. In many instances, however, the result may not be clear. More 
than one statute may compete for application. A single statute may leave 
leeway in determining whether it applies. A statute may authorize the 
decision maker to make a value judgment based on justice or on policy. A 
statute may grant discretion as to which legal consequences are to apply. 
In all of these instances, German legal methods help decision-makers 
reach better results, meaning results that are both correct under the law and 
that comport with general notions of justice or with sound policy. 
Although decision-makers may not make decisions that contradict the law, 
legal methods permit them, indeed direct them, to use these methods to 
reach better results than they might otherwise reach.
66
 In the world of 
Zippelius, legal methods support, rather than hinder, compliance with law 
and doing justice in individual cases.  
In four principal chapters Zippelius explains how German legal 
methods are used to legislate clear law or to facilitate the reaching of 
correct and, hopefully, the best results when law is not clear. In the 
remainder of this Article, I state what I hold to be among the most 
important of his lessons for Americans interested in improving their own 
legal methods.
67
  
 
 
 66. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW] art. 20(1), May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, (Ger.); see also MAXEINER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 22 
(describing the role of statutes in German law). Should the legislature feel a law should be put out of 
force, it then is directed to the Federal Constitutional Court to seek that result. GG art. 93(1), ¶ 2; see 
also Maxeiner, Legal Certainty, supra note 28, at 597–98 (discussing the process to determine unclear 
laws). 
 67. Zippelius gives his own succinct summary for Germans in his Foreword:  
 Pursuant to the principles of separation of powers and legal certainty, it follows that the 
law sets general norms that are binding upon administration and adjudication. Accordingly, 
administrative and judicial bodies must determine as a matter of principle, and according to 
rules of interpretation, what the intent of these norms are; and, in so doing, they must abide 
by that intent. At the same time, however, consideration must also be given to the principal 
function of the law in providing just solutions to problems. Therefore, statutory interpretation 
(interpretation of laws) must strive for fair solutions in line with what is linguistically and 
logically possibly. The function of the law in offering solutions capable of attaining 
consensus to questions of justice can also, however, come into conflict with the strict 
obligation of the law. That happens when the statute, as interpreted according to the rules of 
the art, apparently does not satisfy its function in serving justice. When, in such a case, the 
grounds for doing justice outweigh the grounds for separation of powers and legal certainty—
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A. Concept and Function of the Law
68
 
1. Law Consists of Rules 
Law controls human behavior.
69
 It motivates how people decide. The 
law ―does not describe facts, but prescribes conduct.‖70 
Law consists of rules. Its rules ―are instruments that bring order to 
daily life.‖71 Rules are enforced by the state. Rules should be based on 
general consensus if they are effectively to direct life. Zippelius teaches 
that ―voluntary compliance with norms, societal constraints or even the 
mere threat of procedural enforcement are normally sufficient to allow the 
legal order to function as a general orientation scheme.‖72 Compulsion is 
not always needed.  
Voluntary compliance presupposes that those subject to law know what 
the law requires. Self-application of law is a feature common to successful 
legal systems. 
Law is about obligations and it is about authorizations. According to 
Zippelius, ―The law . . . consists of obligations to do something or refrain 
from doing something, as well as rules regulating the creation, 
modification and termination of behavioral norms or individual rights.‖73 
When we think of law, we think first of obligations, such as stop at a red 
light. But its authorizations are no less important: e.g., a traffic officer may 
stop a motorist that the officer observes is not complying with traffic rules.  
Authorizations take over when rules cannot direct solutions. 
Legislatures cannot anticipate all eventualities; they cannot rationally pre-
determine what all outcomes will be. What they can do is to structure 
authority and its exercise. Then they do not try to calibrate all choices in 
advance. They let government officials or individuals subject to law make 
essential choices. Usually, when legislatures give others leeway in 
 
 
which speak for strict adherence to the wording of the statute—then supplementing or 
correcting the statute is necessary. 
 With all this, the limits of methodical efforts become clear. Considerations structured 
according to interpretation and rules of legal development boil down tin the end to nothing 
more than dissoluble values and areas of leeway in decision-making. In short, the 
interpretation and development of the law are indeed capable of being rationally structured; 
however they are not completely capable of being rationally determined.  
ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at xi–xii (citations omitted). 
 68. Id. at 3. 
 69. Id. at 4. 
 70. Id. at 5. 
 71. Id. at 17. 
 72. Id. at 12. 
 73. Id. at 11. 
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deciding, they do not leave decision-makers free to decide without 
limitation. Usually they require specific criteria or specific procedures for 
those choices.  
Zippelius says the organization of authority is the ―backbone‖ of a 
legal system‘s rational structure.74 What he requires of a legal system is 
that ―the various institutional authorities must be arranged and ordered in 
such a way that the norms and decisions they promulgate contribute to 
consistent (conflict-free) and well-functioning behavioral organization.‖ 
German practice pays close attention to this requirement. It coordinates 
federal and state legislation; it prefers decentralization through local 
administration to decentralization through local legislation. Coordination 
is easier when fewer bodies are allowed to make rules.
75
  
2. The Primary Purpose of Law Is Justice  
The primary task of law, Zippelius teaches, is ―bringing about just 
solutions to the problems that arise between people.‖76 That means that 
law ―must regulate human behavior in such a way that necessities and 
encumbrances are distributed equitably, conflicting interests fairly 
balanced [and] actions worthy of criminal liability justly punished . . . .‖77 
In the legislature, the people through their representatives decide what is 
just and take affirmative steps to establish justice for all. The questions 
they answer may be mundane ones, such as, when must sellers be 
compelled to take back faulty products? Or they may determine issues 
fundamental for a fair society, like when should free disposition of 
property be limited in order to protect the weaker in society?
78
 
Justice is not, however, the only task of law. ―In addition to the task of 
doing justice, there are the requirements of legal certainty, and optimally 
and adequately satisfying competing interests.‖79 These latter tasks may 
not involve justice. They may serve only a function of giving order. For an 
example Zippelius gives the rule that on a highway, the right lane is the 
 
 
 74. Id. at 6. 
 75. See Maxeiner, Legal Certainty, supra note 28, at 562–67. The same challenges now arise in 
the European Union in the requirements of a single European market consistent with demands of 
decentralization through the principle of subsidiarity. 
 76. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 77. Id. at 13. 
 78. Id. at 14. 
 79. Id. 
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travel lane and the left lane the passing lane.
80
 He describes this and 
similar rules as ―value-indifferent legal norms.‖81 
Justice, legal certainty, and societal interests, Zippelius teaches, ―stand 
in a complex relationship: they can complement or they can run contrary 
to each other.‖82 Law serves societal interests, but law should create a just 
social order.
83
 Rules seek legal certainty, but legal certainty serves justice 
by inhibiting arbitrary unequal treatment.
84
 Rules in their generality may 
neglect the particularities of individual cases.
85
 Legal certainty and justice 
may come into conflict.
86
 In cases of conflict, rules that serve only 
interests of order are entitled to less weight than are rules that serve 
justice.
87
 Resolving the conflict is a significant part of the work of legal 
methods. 
3. Rules are Legislatively and Democratically Legitimated  
Legislation is the dominant form of law. Zippelius teaches that 
―[t]oday, as societal relations are regulated largely through legislation, 
questions of justice arise predominantly in this area.‖88 The legislature 
mediates among the demands of justice, legal certainty, and policy. 
Legislation should seek, teaches Zippelius, ―to create a just behavioral 
order that sensibly weighs the interests of community participants against 
one another.‖89  
Those who apply the law are bound to the solution of the legislature 
and to decisional criteria determined by it. In the former case, the 
legislature has ―pre-determined‖ justice and all people are bound by it.90 
 
 
 80. Id. at 15. 
 81. Id. at 16. 
 82. Id. at 14. Gustav Radbruch, leading German legal philosopher of the first half of the 
twentieth century, and Minister of Justice under Gustav Stresemann, is the person perhaps best 
associated with this concept. See Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy § 9, in 4 THE LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN 109 (20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, Kurt 
Wilk trans., 1950), (―Legal certainty demands positivity, yet positive law claims to be valid without 
regard to its justice or expediency [i.e., public policy] . . . .‖); see also MAXEINER, POLICY AND 
METHODS , supra note 63, at 10–14. 
 83. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 14–15. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 14.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 14–15. 
 88. Id. at 15. While rules are predominately statutory, Zippelius allows for judge-made law in 
other systems. In his own system he allows for judicial legal development to make rules more precise a 
choice that has been left open and to fill in gaps. He allows for judge-made rules in other systems 
 89. Id. at 15. 
 90. Id. at 16 (―Accordingly, even questions of justice are predetermined by the legislature.‖). 
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That binding, however, assumes that the issue is unambiguously decided 
in the case at hand.  
When the legislature has not decided an issue, or when that decision in 
an individual case is not unambiguously determined, then legal methods 
help in finding the best solution. That does not mean that decision-makers 
look to their individual consciences. Legitimacy demands otherwise. 
Practical legitimacy requires that ―questions of justice are decided 
according to concepts of justice that are capable of majority consensus, 
rather than very individual ideas and concepts.‖91 Zippelius gives three 
grounds for this view: the ―democratic notion,‖ ―equal treatment‖ and 
―legal certainty.‖92 A democratic society permits broad participation in 
society and expects judges to follow prevalent beliefs.
93
 Equal treatment 
requires that judges use standards that enjoy broad consensus in society 
and are not dependent on particular judges.
94
 Legal certainty requires 
following the same course or, an American might say, valuing precedent.
95
  
Determining what is a concept of justice capable of majority consensus 
is a difficult standard to apply. Consensus should not be equated with the 
ostensible opinion of the majority, since these views often are determined 
by matters other than conscience. Where legal terms leave leeway in 
regard to their meaning, decision-makers can and should give preference 
to interpretations that lead to more just solutions.
96
  
Looking to democratic legitimation, Zippelius answers two general 
issues necessary to understand legislation. Zippelius teaches that statutes 
should be understood objectively, that is, according to ―the intention of the 
statute itself.‖97 An objective interpretation seeks an understanding 
―familiar to the mindset of a wide number of people.‖98 Relying on his 
theory of the state, Zippelius rejects the idea that statutes should be 
interpreted subjectively, i.e., according to the intention of those who 
drafted them.
99
 A subjective interpretation sees statutes as binding 
statements that have their bases in the individual wills of those who took 
part in the legislative process. In a tyrannical state, such as Germany was 
between 1933 and 1945, that is the will of the leader (―Willen des 
 
 
 91. Id. at 23. 
 92. Id. at 25. 
 93. Id. at 24. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 23. 
 96. Id. at 16. 
 97. Id. at 30. 
 98. Id. at 32. 
 99. Id.at 32. Zippelius is known for his many publications on the philosophy of the state. See, 
e.g., REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, GESCHICHTE DER STAATSIDEEN (10th ed. 2003). 
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Führers‖).100 In a democratic state, such as Germany is today, a subjective 
interpretation is practically excluded. Those who adopt a statute are 
numerous. Their individual wills are difficult to determine and are unlikely 
to be in harmony with one another.
101
 
Zippelius teaches that statutes should be interpreted according to ideas 
of the present (―living interpretation‖) and not according to ideas 
controlling at the time they were adopted (―interpretation at the time of 
inception‖).102 He argues that ―[t]he basis of legitimacy of law to be 
applied today does not lie in the past; it lies in the present. . . . For the 
present it does not matter under whose authority the statute was enacted, 
but rather under whose authority it lives on today.‖103 For that reason 
German ministries of justice are responsible for removing from the statute 
books obsolete laws. Some newer German laws as adopted automatically 
expire.
104
 
The concept and function of law among Americans is little different 
from that among Germans. The school book writer referenced above could 
have been quoting Justinian’s Digest when he wrote: ―Civil Government is 
that system of laws, whether written or printed or transmitted by custom, 
which is established to secure and promote justice and order.‖105 We the 
people of the United States declare in the Preamble of our Constitution 
that our State exists ―to establish justice [and to] insure domestic 
tranquility.‖106 
Justice Scalia reminds Americans, that the rule of law is a law of 
rules.
107
 Legislation has been dominant in the United States in practice, if 
not in law professors‘ theories, for over a century. Common law with little 
legislation, says Scalia ―is now barely extant.‖108 Schauer concedes that 
―[t]his image of the common law has no real-world instantiations.‖109 
 
 
 100. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 31. 
 101. Id. at 33. 
 102. Id. at 34. 
 103. Id. at 34, 35. While considerations of legitimacy and of justice demand a living 
interpretation, Zippelius teaches that considerations of separation of powers (and we might add, of 
legal certainty), require that ―a change in meaning must not only keep itself within the possible 
meanings of the text of a legal norm, but also, where possible, within that very range of meaning that 
the purpose of the legislation leaves open for honing in on.‖ Id. at 36. 
 104. OECD, BETTER REGULATION IN EUROPE: GERMANY, 114–15 (2010), available at http:// 
www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3746,en_2649_34141_45048895_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
 105. GOODRICH, supra note 23, at 42 (first emphasis in the original; second emphasis added). 
 106. CONST. pmbl. 
 107. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1989). 
 108. Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U.L. REV. 687, 689 
(2006) [hereinafter Review]. 
 109. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 105. Yet American jurists, Schauer included, persist in teaching, 
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Voluntary compliance presupposes that those subject to the law know 
what the law requires. The common law cannot do that. It has been dubbed 
―the sublime of incomprehensibility.‖110 Were Americans to take 
rulemaking seriously, they would consistently adopt statutes that people—
or at least people‘s lawyers—could understand with reasonable certainty. 
Scalia reminds us that Americans are not there yet. To the contrary, he 
challenges legislators not to accept a multiplication of imprecise laws and 
fuzzy legislation.
111
  
In our preoccupation with adjudication and lawmaking through 
adjudication we have failed to establish reliable techniques for making 
better laws. Our lack of attention to the organizing side of law has left us 
with scores of competing laws that do not mesh with one another. We 
have long known of the importance of coordination for laws, but have 
done little to act on that knowledge.
112
 
American practice lacks a backbone of institutional coordination. It 
foregoes opportunities to structure decision-making to permit decision-
makers to search for best solutions for this case. It is premised on the 
assumption that each legislature has provided the right answer to a legal 
problem beforehand. Each appellate court finds itself choosing, as Schauer 
notes, between a solution it sees as mandated by present law and a solution 
it deems better for the majority of future cases.  
Case law lacks opportunity and legitimacy to provide needed rules. 
Schauer notes that it can only deal with cases presented to it and these 
cases may not be representative. Case law, he notes, is made by judges 
who do not have legitimacy to make rules generally. When case law goes 
beyond filling the interstices of precedent or statute, it goes too far. 
Similarly Scalia rejects robust case law. Government, he says, draws its 
authority from the consent of the governed. A democracy is ―quite 
incompatible with the making (or the ‗finding‘) of law by judges . . . . ‖113 
 
 
to the near exclusion of modern legal methods, a legal method that is not of this world. Perhaps out of 
nostalgia they seek to resuscitate A Common Law for the Age of Statutes. See generally GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
 110. JAMES KIRKE PAULDING, The Perfection of Reason, in THE MERRY TALES OF THE THREE 
WISE MEN OF GOTHAM 105, 128 (2d ed., 1839). 
 111. Sykes v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). 
 112. See ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION: AN ESTIMATE OF 
RESTRICTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FACTORS 225 (1917) [hereinafter FREUND, STANDARDS] (referring 
to ―correlation‖ of laws); see also Ernst Freund, Prolegomena to a Science of Legislation, 13 ILL. L. 
REV. 264, 268 (1918) [hereinafter Freund, Prolegomena] (urging advancement of systematic 
legislation).  
 113. Scalia, Review, supra note 108, at 689. Much to the same effect, see Hart, supra note 55, at 
971 (finding the robust form of case law sometimes asserted in America to be ―particularly hard to 
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B. Legal Rules Consist of Syllogisms that Work Together  
Zippelius teaches that legal rules are logical syllogisms that work 
together. They are made up of major premises (law), minor premises 
(facts), and conclusions (legal consequences).
114
 Their application is 
deductive.
115
 He stresses the importance of minding a strict relationship 
between the particular factual attributes required by a rule and the legal 
consequence that it prescribes. All of the individual factual attributes of a 
rule must be present for the legal consequence to apply; if only one is 
missing, the legal consequence does not attach.
116
  
The strict relationship between factual requisites and legal 
consequences has great importance for legal certainty guidance and for 
legal process efficiency.
117
 Once it is clear that a single required factual 
attribute is not present, there is no need to be concerned whether that 
particular rule applies.
118
 There is no need to look for other factual 
attributes of that rule.
119
 If that is the only rule that comes into 
consideration, legal process can end.
120
 
Syllogisms are how legislation orders decision-making. It assigns 
decisions to particular persons; it may allow those charged with deciding 
room for judgment as whether the law applies or it may grant them 
discretion in what action to take if they determine that the law does apply.  
Syllogisms may be simple, such as ―all men are mortal, Socrates is a 
man, so Socrates is mortal.‖ Or they may be complex: they may require 
that factual requisites be taken from a number of individual provisions and 
 
 
justify in a democracy‖). This idea is not new to America. See, e.g., WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES 
OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 378 (7th ed., 1st Am. ed. Philadelphia, 1788) (―The first 
maxim of a free state is, that the laws be made by one set of men, and administered by another; in 
other words, that the legislative and judicial characters be kept separate.‖). For Paley’s importance in 
America and in early American law, see Wilson Smith, William Paley's Theological Utilitarianism in 
America, 11 WM. & MARY Q. (3d SERIES) 402 (1954). Schauer implicitly acknowledges the point 
when he explains that the failure of the common law results from public discomfort with empowering 
judges to make decisions about deeply contested social ideas and judicial discomfort in accepting it. 
 114. See ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 39–43. 
 115. See id. 
 116. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 43, 110 (―Rules are norms that are either applied or not applied in 
a particular case.‖). 
 117. Unless specifically authorized by the rule, there is no room for balancing tests that are 
commonly utilized by American courts. See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in 
the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT‘L L. 109, 119, 174 (2003) 
[hereinafter Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting]. 
 118. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 43. 
 119. Id. 
 120. The same idea is present in American motions to dismiss cases either on pleadings or 
dismissal on summary judgment.  
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joined together. Zippelius terms incorporation by reference use of 
supplementary provisions. Supplementary provisions simplify by 
increasing legal certainty not only in lawmaking, but in application, 
including in self-application, of law. At first glance, this might seem 
counterintuitive: would it not be easier to read in one place all the 
necessary requisites of a rule? Often, however, more than one rule may 
apply to a given factual complex. By using supplementary provisions, the 
same requisite can apply throughout all cases. In Germany, statutes have 
―general parts‖ that regulate questions common to more than one of the 
substantive matters they address. Conflicts of rules are reduced. Without 
incorporation by reference, in every rule it would be necessary to build in 
all the different exceptions and modifications one might think of. 
Good legislation avoids conflicts among legal rules. Not only should it, 
Zippelius teaches that good order demands that it must. He writes: ―If 
norms regulating behavior are to provide legal tranquility and a guarantee 
of helping the citizen orient his or her behavior, then they may not 
contradict [an]other; in fact they must complement one another.‖ He gives 
half a dozen examples of how the German legal system writes rules to 
avoid conflicts.
121
 It is a simple point: self-application of law is impossible 
when law demands contradictory behavior.  
Syllogisms are at the heart of American law.
122
 Justice Scalia advises 
lawyers who want to persuade judges: ―Think syllogistically.‖123 Judges 
instruct jurors to apply law syllogistically to facts jurors find. Law schools 
teach students the syllogistic elements of causes of action; bar examiners 
examine on those syllogisms; lawyers bring lawsuits on the basis of 
elements of causes of action. 
 
 
 121. I list six legal norms that are familiar to Americans: 
(a) The law avoids a conflict by explicitly excluding its application in certain instances where 
otherwise there would be conflict. 
(b) The law avoids a conflict by permitting multiple norms to apply cumulatively.  
(c) The conflict is resolved by applying only one norm through a choice based on a rule of 
specialty, i.e., the more specific provision applies.  
(d) The conflict is resolved by applying the higher level norm (e.g., the Constitution over 
statute, federal statute over state statute, etc.). 
(e) The conflict is resolved by applying the statute adopted later in time. 
(f) The apparent conflict is resolved by interpreting statutes to avoid a conflict. 
See ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 51–57. 
 122. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL REASONING 2, 19–20, 67–70 (1996). 
 123. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING 
JUDGES 41 (2008). 
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What ails American legal methods is not an absence of syllogisms, but 
presence of too many poor ones that do not fit together well. American 
syllogisms are expected to be simple. Simple syllogisms can ignore 
important variations of life. A complex syllogism is a generalization that 
does not ignore features that justify a departure from the general rule.
124
 
Complex syllogisms, however, demand lawmakers who can write them 
and law-appliers who can apply them.  
American syllogisms are simple so that lay jurors can apply them. 
Although jurors are instructed in syllogisms, no reasonable lawyer 
believes that most jurors are able to and do follow instructions closely in 
any but the simplest of cases. To deal with these infirmities trial lawyers 
long ago shifted their attentions from syllogisms to what they call the 
―theory of the case.‖125  
Creating complex syllogisms practically compels complex lawmaking 
procedures that are not standard in the United States. While writing an 
isolated syllogism is within the capability of a competent lawyer, writing a 
syllogism that fits well with all of the other syllogisms in the legal system 
is a challenge that often is beyond the capability of any one person. A 
single legislator is no more able to write suitable laws than is a single 
judge. For over a century elsewhere in the world, responsibility for the 
drafting of laws has been located outside of the legislature itself. An 
institution, commonly a ministry of justice, is supposed to see to it that 
new syllogisms coordinate well with old ones. All of this has long been 
known in the United States, if little appreciated.
126
 Both the American 
Law Institute and the Uniform Laws Commission are efforts to deal with 
the problem. They lack neither skill in drafting nor process to develop 
such syllogisms. What these national and similar state institutions lack is 
political clout to get the laws that they propose enacted. 
C. Statutes are Interpreted to Solve Legal Problems 
Statutes and other legal rules put ideas into words. Words make ideas 
communicable and give them fixed form. The words of statutes serve legal 
certainty. They guide people in how to act; they control those charged with 
carrying out statutes. Words are, however, ambiguous; they may refer to 
 
 
 124. Contra The Failure of the Common Law, supra note 45, at 778 (―[T]he generalizations that 
best suit large classes of particulars are generalizations that ignore feature—even relevant ones—of 
particular cases.‖). 
 125. MAXEINER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 131. 
 126. FREUND, STANDARDS, supra note 112, at 225; Freund, Prolegomena, at 268. 
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more than one concept.
127
 Understanding a statute means associating 
correct concepts with statutes‘ words. People cannot apply rules—to 
themselves—or to others, if they do not know which concepts apply in the 
context of concrete cases. 
Zippelius explains that words that describe facts seldom carry the same 
meaning for everyone. A given word has a ―range of meanings.‖128 That 
does not make the word wholly uncertain. The limit of the range of 
meanings of the word limits the range of interpretations of statutes using 
the word. For example, a statute that applies only to cats might be 
interpreted to apply to tigers but cannot, consistent with the meaning of its 
words, apply to dogs.
129
 Within the range, there may be many possible 
meanings; it is the task of interpretation to identify the correct meaning.
130
 
To identify which meaning yields the correct interpretation Zippelius 
uses the four ―classical‖ interpretative criteria of German law: 
―grammatical,‖ ―logical,‖ ―historical‖ and ―systemic.‖131 We need not 
expound on these criteria here; Zippelius explains them lucidly.
132
  
From the standpoint of legal certainty and predictability, a range of 
meanings is a drawback. Zippelius argues, however, that such latitude is 
often an advantage: it gives law flexibility. ―This range of meaning allows 
these general legal words to adapt to the wide and diverse range of legal 
problems and circumstances of life that the law seeks to regulate, as well 
as to the changing prevalent social-ethical views.‖133 Legislatures do this 
deliberately when they use what are known as general clauses.
134
 
The classical criteria of interpretation, while they facilitate finding the 
correct interpretation, do not give license to go outside the range of 
possible meanings of a statute‘s words. Zippelius explains: ―All further 
 
 
 127. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 28. Anyone who has studied a foreign language knows this.  
 128. Id. at 62–66. 
 129. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 
(2009) (a tiger may be a cat, but not a dog); SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 155 (a cat or bat is not a dog). 
For H.L.A. Hart‘s famous discussion of interpretation, see American Jurisprudence Through English 
Eyes, supra note 55. 
 130. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 67. 
 131. Id. at 60. Zimmermann likewise puts forward four classical interpretive criteria of German 
law, also drawn from Savigny, but with somewhat different designations. See Reinhard Zimmermann, 
Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Perspective, 56 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 315, 320 (1997) (― (1) the literal meaning of the words or the grammatical structure 
of a sentence, (2) the legislative history, (3) the systematic context and (4) the design, or purpose, of a 
legal rule.‖ (citing 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 206 
(1840) (translated as SYSTEM OF THE ROMAN LAW (William Holloway trans., 1979) (1867))).  
 132. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 59–62. 
 133. Id. at 66. 
 134. For example, requirements for good faith in contract performance.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] THINKING LIKE A LAWYER ABROAD 79 
 
 
 
 
efforts at interpretation proceed on the basis of a word‘s possible meaning. 
These efforts are carried out within a range of meaning that is permissible 
according to linguistic usage (possibly circumscribed by legal 
definitions).
135
 To go outside the range of possible meanings creates a 
legitimacy problem;
136
 it is to take over the function reserved to the 
legislature.
137
 The text then, is not the end, but it is an end. 
Zippelius teaches that interpretation is argumentative. That is, from 
among a range of possible meanings, all of which are more or less 
representable, one must be selected.
138
 ―When interpretive arguments 
conflict, there is no strictly rational hierarchy between them.‖139 ―In 
choosing a particular meaning, it is necessary to justify the choice—that is, 
provide reasons for choosing it.‖140 The most important criterion is 
―[w]hich of the possible ‗justifiable‘ interpretations, according to the rules 
of the art, lead to the most just solution?‖141 Interpretation is thus case 
―result-oriented.‖142 It is not creation of new rules for future cases. 
In Germany court interpretations of statutes, like court decisions 
generally, are not binding (no doctrine of ―statutory precedent‖). At the 
first instance level, judges are to orient interpretation on the legislative 
language. Their judgments are to address issues of statutory interpretation 
only to the extent necessary to decide cases before them.  
That is not to say that judges ignore precedential values. Judges in the 
first instance pay attention to appellate court interpretations of statutes if 
only because they do not like to be reversed. At all levels judges interpret 
statutes aware of possible general applicability. Zippelius explains: ―Since 
an interpretation capable of generalization is sought here, there is a focus 
on results by way of categorization that goes beyond the circumstances of 
the individual case. However, even here the dependence of a legal decision 
on the particular facts is clear.‖143 As a result: 
interpretations and gap-fillers, once chosen by courts, attain a 
certain binding character; this follows from the principles of equal 
 
 
 135. Id. at 67. 
 136. Id. at 96. 
 137. Cf. id. at 72. 
 138. Zippelius quotes the Federal Constitutional Court: ―Interpretation . . . has the attributes of a 
discourse, in which even methodically unobjectionable work yields no absolutely correct statements 
welcomed without doubt or reservation by all experts.‖ Id. at 67 (citation omitted). 
 139. Id. at 86. 
 140. Id. at 67. 
 141. Id. at 86. 
 142. See id. at 84. 
 143. Id. at 84. 
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treatment and legal certainty. . . . [O]nce an interpretation or gap-
filler is chosen, and it is justified with the latitudes allowed 
hermeneutically, it may not be overruled without good reason.
144
 
Interpretation does not always reach just solutions.
145
 This does not 
invariably require that judges give up seeking just and fair solutions. 
Sometimes interpretation fails because the law provides no answer. In 
such cases statutes require supplementation, either through future 
legislation or through judicial gap-filling of existing law.
146
 In filling in 
gaps, it is appropriate to consider societal goals, system consistency and 
justice.
147
 Gap-filling to achieve material justice, raises the question 
whether supplementation should be done politically, for the future by the 
legislature, or according to existing law, by judges. Zippelius warns that 
[b]y supplementing the law, the judge is functioning in a manner reserved 
for the legislature under a system of separation of powers. The legislature 
is in a better position than a court to tackle questions of legal 
supplementation—considerations that are often highly political in nature—
and it does so with more democratic legitimacy, particularly with respect 
to the necessary debate and conversation with the public.
148
 
Other times, a statute fails to achieve justice because the answer it 
provides is unacceptable. The statute needs correction. Correcting statutes 
is more controversial than filling gaps. It is easier from the standpoint of 
legitimacy for courts to act when the legal text provides no answer than 
when it provides a bad answer. Article 20(3) of the German Constitution 
challenges judges to be alert to a need to correct the legislature in the 
interest of justice. It provides: ―Legislation is subject to the constitutional 
order; the executive and the judiciary are bound by law and justice.‖149 
Nevertheless, on grounds of separation of powers and legal certainty, 
departing from a law‘s text is justified only by ―overwhelming reasons of 
 
 
 144. Id. at 110–11. The binding nature is not, he says, that which the ―strict doctrine of ‗stare 
decisis‘‖ of Anglo-American law asserts over inferior courts, but rather that which common law 
appellate courts apply to their own decisions: ―not departing from like decisions without very good 
reasons.‖ Id. at 112 (citing D. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 227 
(1978)). 
 145. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 17. (―fail to reach a just solution that satisfies a certain sense of 
the law;‖ in the German original, ―nicht zu einer gerechten, das Rechtsgefühl befriedigenden Lösung 
führen‖). 
 146. Id. at 17. 
 147. Id. at 97. 
 148. Id. at 91. 
 149. GG art. 20(3); AXEL TSCHENTSCHER, THE BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ): THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 28 (2d ed. 2008). 
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justice.‖150 Then there are but two possibilities. If the text leaves open the 
possibility that the particular problem was not considered, the court may 
decide the issue. If, on the other hand, the text clearly applies, the court 
may not put the statute out of force. What the court can and should do, is 
to refer the case to the Federal Constitutional Court, which has the 
exclusive authority to invalidate law.
151
 
Zippelius‘ description of interpreting statutes is deceptively familiar for 
Americans: ―Interpreting a statute means ascertaining the meaning of the 
words found within a legal text, namely the facts, values, and prescriptive 
ideas that these words seek to describe.‖152 He adds ―[w]e wouldn‘t be far 
off in our result today if . . . we were to formulate the view, according to 
which the goal of interpretation is to determine what the ideas of the 
legislator were . . . .‖153 That could be the beginning of an American book 
on statutory interpretation; indeed, it practically is.
154
 His discussion of the 
four classical interpretative criteria of German law could be a discussion 
of what are known in America as canons of statutory interpretation.
155
 
There is, however, one little noted but critical difference between 
German and American practices of statutory interpretation. This difference 
helps answer our puzzle of why legal methods in America seem to work 
against just decisions but facilitate them in Germany.  
In Germany, statutory interpretation is primarily an aid in law-
applying. It helps those subject to the law, and those who must apply law 
to others to understand the factual requisites the law requires and correctly 
to classify behavior within an existing system. For Zippelius, ―continued 
legal development‖ through statutory interpretation is secondary ‗to 
finding the appropriate interpretation or gap-fillers for the individual 
case.‖156 Appellate decisions interpreting statutes are not strictly binding 
on lower courts, which may, for good reasons stated, depart from them.
157
 
In every case, decision-makers start from statutory texts. 
 
 
 150. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 113. 
 151. Id. at 92 (referencing decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court). 
 152. Id. at 59. 
 153. Id. at 60.  
 154. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION 
OF THE LAWS 1 (2d ed. 1911) (―Interpretation, as applied to written law, is the art or process of 
discovering and expounding the intended signification of the language used, that is, the meaning which 
the authors of the law designed it to convey to others.‖). 
 155. Cf. CROSS, supra note 129. 
 156. ZIPPELIUS at 111. For continued legal development generally, see MATTHIAS KLATT, 
MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT: THE NORMATIVITY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION (2008), being a 
translation with additional material of his THEORIE DER WORTLAUTGRENZE. SEMANTISCHE 
NORMATIVITÄT IN DER JURISTISCHEN ARGUMENTATION (2004) 
 157. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 108, 110–12. In one of his few comparative comments, here 
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In the United States, on the other hand, statutory interpretation is part 
of lawmaking.
158
 It is used by courts of last resort to declare what the law 
requires and to control what lower courts later do. For Schauer, making 
decisions in individual cases amounts to making prospective rules; those 
rules should reach ―the best results for the largest number of cases.‖159 
Appellate decisions interpreting statutes are binding on lower courts, who 
may not deviate from them. The doctrine is known as ―statutory 
precedent.‖ So strongly is it held that commonly lower courts in applying 
statutes begin their process of reasoning from a higher court‘s precedent 
interpreting a statute rather than from the statute itself.
160
 
Remarkable about this difference is that it produces results that are 
contrary to American prejudices about Continental civil law. Americans 
think of Continental civil law as providing detailed solutions that foreclose 
judicial flexibility.
161
 In fact, often it is just the reverse. The German 
system comes off as flexible and concerned with equitable outcomes in 
individual cases, while it is the American system that is rigid and rule-
bound. It is American judges who, must choose between the rule-bound 
decision and the ―right‖ decision. 
The doctrine of statutory precedent is sometimes seen as judges taking 
over a lawmaking function more properly belonging to the legislature. The 
doctrine gives the appellate court the last word on a statute until the 
legislature acts again. In effect, the appellate court becomes ―a political 
competitor with the legislator in the creation of law.‖162 
Although some American judges enjoy the power that statutory 
precedent gives them, it is likely that their motives in adopting it were 
more benign. It is one way, Schauer would say, for judges to control 
 
 
Zippelius distinguishes German practice from common law stare decisis. Id. 
 158. It is not uncommon for legislative compromise to leave important issues for decision by 
courts later. 
 159. Schauer, The Failure of Common Law, supra note 45, at 770, 779.  
 160. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 231 (1999). 
But see SCHAUER at 158 (―[T]he words of a statute are almost always the starting point . . . .‖). 
 161. Schauer himself speaks of a ―highly precise canonical statement of the law.‖ See text at note 
45 supra. 
 162. See Strauss, supra note 160, at 244–45. Zippelius, were he confronted with the doctrine, 
almost surely would find it ―assuming a function reserved to the legislature—the institution, under a 
state system of separation of powers, that is more competent than the courts to make such legal and 
political decisions.‖ ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 72 (condemning judicial definition of undefined 
statutory terms beyond that necessary to decide the case or to make changes in the law). He continues: 
―Legislative and parliamentary bodies typically have at their disposal better sources of information, 
and as such, they make decisions through the necessary debate and consultation of the public, in 
accordance with the democratic controls necessary for all political decision-making processes.‖ Id. 
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themselves.
163
 It is at the same time extension of a conventional elderly 
doctrine, precedent, to an area that now in the present is the focus of 
judicial activity. The doctrine of statutory precedent responds to a need of 
American litigating lawyers for certainty in preparing their cases. 
American procedure systems assign to lawyers principal responsibility for 
preparing cases for decision: it is up to the lawyers to present evidence 
material to the issues defined by a cause of action. If statutory language is 
unclear, lawyers want clear judicial guidance before they investigate the 
case and present it to the court.
164
 Statutory precedent gives them that 
guidance even if it forecloses interpretations that might be more likely to 
produce justice in individual cases. This same need explains why in 
America, instead of flexible standards of interpretation such as the classic 
interpretative criteria applied argumentatively, we have been inclined to 
treat interpretation itself as rule-based. In our history we have seen canons 
of construction, a Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act, a proposed 
Restatement of Statutory Interpretation,
165
 and a proposed Federal Rule of 
Statutory Interpretation.
166
  
American appellate procedure magnifies the effects of the doctrine of 
statutory precedent. In America findings of fact in first instance normally 
bind appellate courts. They have little opportunity to revise them. They do 
have control over law. Their decisions about law change law. When faced 
with a decision below that they find unjust, if they cannot find a way to 
reverse proceedings and return the case for reconsideration, they are 
tempted to change the law to get the right result. Hence, we say, ―hard 
cases make bad law.‖  
Much the same effect is apparent even in the first instance. There, the 
passivity of the trial court judge with respect to facts leaves development 
of facts to the lawyers themselves. While it might be true that further 
factual explanation would eliminate or ameliorate issues of statutory 
interpretation, the judicial ethic of passivity makes exploration of those 
facts difficult.  
 
 
 163. Schauer, The Failure of Common Law, supra note 45, at 779.  
 164. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 641, 644 (1989). This is 
not a critical issue in Germany since issues remain open until the last oral hearing. See MAXEINER, 
FAILURES, supra note 8, at 182–83. 
 165. Gary E. O‘Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL‘Y 333, 335 (2003). 
 166. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (discussing different strategies to structure statutory interpretation in the 
form of rules). 
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In Germany, on the other hand, appellate procedure encourages courts 
to find the best possible decisions. The first appeal is focused—as is the 
initial proceeding—on the best answer for this case. If it finds the decision 
below unjust it may take further evidence. It then concludes on the basis of 
this evidence that the law should be applied differently or that a different 
law applies.  
In the United States, discussions of statutory interpretation are less 
about how lower courts should decide cases and more about whether 
appellate courts can be controlled in their development of law. ―Central to 
the analysis,‖ it is said, ―is the concern that judges will be willful and 
outcome oriented in their decisions. This means that they choose the result 
that they prefer and then manipulate the legal materials to support that 
result.‖167 The result that is feared, is not the equitable result in the 
individual case, but the legislative result for future cases.  
In other words, statutory interpretation in the United States is 
principally an issue of binding and controlling courts. In Germany, on the 
other hand, statutory interpretation is principally an issue of guiding 
decision makers at all levels to optimal solutions of legal problems. 
D. Applying Law Brings Facts and Law Together 
Application of law to facts requires that law and facts be brought 
together. The vehicle is the legal syllogism: the law is the major premise, 
facts are the minor premise, and the legal consequences follow. Zippelius 
teaches that applying the syllogism is the easy part. The part that can be 
difficult is the discovery and definition of applicable law and the 
determination of material facts. He advises colorfully: ―legal decisions 
will be found playing a musical ensemble of premise searching, premise 
restricting, and premise establishment as well as formal logical 
thinking.‖168  
The problem that Zippelius addresses and that German legal methods 
deal with is the interdependency of law and facts. Until one knows the 
applicable rules, one does not know which facts are material. But until one 
knows the facts, one does not know which rules are applicable. Settle the 
applicable rules too soon, and facts may be overlooked which would 
change results were other rules applied. Fail to settle the applicable rules 
 
 
 167. CROSS, supra note 129, at ix. 
 168. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 117. Zippelius quotes the German philosopher Schopenhauer: ―to 
find the premises is the difficulty, and there we leave logic behind us.‖ Id. 
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soon enough and the process may detour to find facts that are not material 
under the rules actually applied.  
In most cases of daily life, the interdependency of law and fact is not a 
problem. Which rules apply is clear, the party subject to them knows the 
facts and applies the rules to him or herself. As matters get more complex, 
or the applicable rules less certain, the party subject to them may need 
legal counsel. If other parties are involved, and if they have different views 
of applicable law or material fact, and negotiation, mediation or litigation 
may become necessary to bring law and facts together. Self-application is 
facilitated by clear rules that require easily ascertainable facts. 
When parties differ on results, ―[t]he court applies legal norms as rules 
to established facts.‖169 The establishment of the facts is for the parties. 
The court knows the law (iura novit curia); the parties know the facts. 
Once the parties have established the facts, the court can determine their 
rights (da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius—give me the facts; I will give you 
right). The process is interactive and interdependent. Parties and courts 
cooperate.
170
 
Bringing law and facts together begins with the exchange of pleadings 
and occurs in nearly every case. The court meets with the parties and 
discusses which legal rules may govern the case, their material elements 
and which of those elements are in dispute. Where different rules are 
considered, the court may make a preliminary choice among them. The 
judge directs proceedings to those matters material to decision and in 
dispute. Zippelius describes how this works: 
The changing allocation between norm and factual behavior usually 
takes place in a ‗back and forth wandering glance‘ (Engisch) among 
many of the steps of an advanced selection, which means that in 
continually eliminating irrelevant norms, application possibilities 
and facts, one begins with mostly just an approximate allocation 
from the larger area of test worthy norms, applicable alternatives 
and circumstances of fact that are considered.
171
 
There is no presentation of a case. Instead, ―it may be necessary to pose 
questions in a series of stages, feeling one‘s way toward the relevant 
catalogue of norms, whereby at each step we consider and compare the 
facts of the case to the legal consequence.‖172 
 
 
 169. Id. at 124.  
 170. See MAXEINER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 177–78. 
 171. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 121–22.  
 172. Id. at 119–20. 
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In American parlance, what the German judge is doing is narrowing 
issues. The judge is searching to find and define the relevant legal norms 
that he or she is to apply to the facts to be established. For each possible 
rule, the judge determines which elements of the rule are material to the 
case and which are in dispute between the parties. Unlike the American 
process issue-narrowing in Germany is on-going and continues until the 
very end of the process. There is no need ever to settle on one or more 
issues as determinative. The court is never to decide any issue without the 
parties knowing that that decision is imminent and having an opportunity 
to take a position on it. When the applicability of all potential norms is 
determined, the court gives its decision and, within a short time, justifies it 
in a formal judgment. 
Because the court determines issues of proof, there are no rules of 
evidence such as Americans know. German courts take evidence and give 
it such probative value as they believe that it deserves. This is what 
American judges often do in bench trials. Zippelius writes of ―The 
Judicial Establishment of Facts in Particular.‖173 He tells us how ―[t]he 
judge decides whether the required degree of probability exists, basically 
in free consideration of evidence.‖174  
German legal methods avoid many of the risks of contest-oriented legal 
process. Cases should not fail because advocates overlook applicable rules 
or essential elements to rules. Opportunities to mislead decision-makers or 
leave decision-makers with unanswered questions are reduced when 
decision-makers and advocates work together in bringing law and fact 
together. 
German legal methods affirmatively provide avenues for decision 
makers to find their way to just decisions. They are not compelled to make 
binary choices between unjust legal decisions and best results. If an 
outcome seems wrong, they can get a better understanding of the facts by 
asking the parties to present more information. That may call for a 
different outcome under the same rule, under a different rule or under a 
general clause.
175
  
 
 
 173. Id. at 126 (emphasis added). 
 174. Id. at 129. 
 175. The American Cappalli criticizes this practice as ―massaging the facts.‖ RICHARD B. 
CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD 188 (1997). He prefers the common law approach 
that permits courts to ―move the rules toward the facts.‖ Id. at 187. 
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1. Room for Judgment in Finding Factual Prerequisites 
Carefully crafted rules are not always sufficient to reach just decisions. 
To facilitate just decisions in individual cases where statutes cannot 
preprogram them, statutes extend to decision-makers both room for 
judgment and discretion. 
Room for judgment occurs when a statute uses a term with an 
indefinite meaning. Zippelius gives as an example of room for judgment 
the term ―forest.‖ Is a ―small, free-standing, natural pine woods with 
approximately 50 half-grown trees‖ a forest?‖176 Suppose the requisite 
element for a crime of arson is setting fire to a forest. Classifying this 
stand of trees as a forest is for Zippelius preeminently a question of 
interpreting the statute and not one of subsuming the facts under the 
statute. In so doing, that interpretation then gives ―meaning for future 
cases.‖177 In other words, the specific case ―gives the impetus to weigh and 
to make precise the range of the meaning of the norm—with regard to the 
submitted facts of behavior.‖178 This is yet another example of the 
interdependency of law and facts: giving the norm substance ―takes place 
with reference to the extant reality of life in a ‗back and forth wandering 
glance‘ between the norm and those facts of behavior relevant to the norm 
(§ 14 II).‖179 The legislature has left the combining of the different norms, 
i.e., whether this sort of group of trees falls with the range of the definition 
of forest, to ―institutional legal thinking.‖180  
A general clause is one that depends on an indefinite legal concept as 
the operative provision. German statutes use general clauses to take into 
account the many sides of life that do not lend themselves to definition in 
clearly defined concepts. By using general clauses, legislation need not be 
fragmentary, but can be gap free.
181
  
 
 
 176. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 2, at 131. Note that in this subchapter Zippelius discusses indefinite 
terms that are descriptive, such as ―forest.‖ Elsewhere he has already discussed indefinite terms that 
include a valuing element, e.g., ―negligently.‖  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 132. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 133 (citations omitted). 
 181. KARL ENGISCH, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN 124. German indefinite legal 
concepts are best known in the United States through two general clauses of the German Civil Code, 
sections 138 and 242, which have become parts of American law through adoption in the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.). BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, RGBL 
195, as amended, §§ 138, 242. Section 138‘s U.C.C. counterpart is section 2-302, which permits 
nonenforcement of ―unconscionable‖ contracts or terms. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004). Section 242 requires 
performance of contracts in ―good faith,‖ BGB § 242; its U.C.C. counterpart is section 1-304 (formerly 
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General clauses do not permit judges to decide what they think is ―fair‖ 
or in the ―general welfare.‖182 Instead, case groups develop in an almost 
common-law manner.
183
 Only where there are no prior decisions do judges 
have some freedom in reaching new solutions.
184
 Sometimes the 
legislature notes the development of these case groups and enacts them 
into law or introduces its own groups of cases.  
When such indefinite concepts are used, there may be no ―one meaning 
to be made from general persuasive reasons.‖ There thus becomes a range 
of ―justifiable decisions,‖ although ―some interpretations are more 
justifiable than others.‖ Zippelius prefers those interpretations that ―can be 
comprehensibly grounded upon (if not compelled by) rational arguments 
rather than proven through general persuasive arguments.‖185 
2. Discretion in Directing Legal Consequences 
Sometimes statutes deliberately do not bind decision-makers to one 
correct decision, but grant them discretion to reach their own decisions 
based on their own responsibility and independent choice. It is used to 
permit a purposeful and just decision in the individual case. A common 
view in Germany holds that discretion is appropriate only on the legal-
consequences side of the legal norm. That is, discretion in choice of legal 
consequences (e.g., five or ten years imprisonment) is appropriate, but not 
in determination of the prerequisites for action (e.g., whether defendant 
committed the crime of arson). This distinction marks a difference 
between indefinite legal concepts and discretion: the former leaves room 
for judgment in the prerequisites of action, while the latter provides for 
freedom of action. 
Administrative authorities are allowed to make policy-oriented 
decisions upon their own responsibility; they may choose on the basis of 
current and local interests among several possibilities. This freedom is 
acceptable because administrative authorities are politically accountable. 
Administrative authorities are nonetheless obligated to exercise their 
freedom of choice in the public interest. Relaxation of binding to statute 
 
 
section 1-203). U.C.C. § 1-304. For the origin of section 2-302, see Maxeiner, Standard-Terms 
Contracting, supra note 117, at 116–17. 
 182. See Franz Wieacker, Zur rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des § 242 BGB, in 2 
AUSGEWÄHLTE SCHRIFTEN 195, 203 (1983). 
 183. See Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting, supra note 117, at 152–56. 
 184. Wieacker, supra note 182, at 203. Wieacker also notes that section 242 looks to issues of 
individual justice and not to general welfare (policy). Id. at 196. 
 185. Id. at 135. 
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for judicial decisions, on the other hand, is preferably limited to situations 
where necessary to permit judges to do justice in individual cases. Judges 
are not politically accountable; they are guaranteed independence to 
permit them to do justice.
186
 The German legal system uses rules in this 
way to depoliticize certain decisions. It attempts to separate legal 
questions from political ones. A legal question should be subject to 
resolution without having to value.
187
 
3. Reasoned Explanations 
In lawsuits, judges are required to give reasoned explanations for their 
judgments. These judgments must deal with all possibly relevant laws and 
party assertions. They have a prescribed form. Zippelius explains that 
reasoned opinions help make up for shortcomings of statutes. As we just 
saw, legislation cannot always predetermine solutions. Both legal and 
factual premises may be uncertain. Sometimes legislation deliberately 
grants law appliers a certain room for judgment as to whether a rule 
applies (e.g., what constitutes ―good faith‖) or discretion in ordering the 
legal consequences of an applicable rule (e.g., whether to order 
imprisonment or not). In all of these cases, choices of interpretation and 
fact-finding possibilities do not always direct decision-makers to a single 
correct solution. Yet, Zippelius stresses, that does not mean that all 
justifiable decisions are alike. Some findings of fact, determinations of law 
and applications of laws to facts are more justifiable than others.  
Reasoned opinions enhance the quality of legal decisions. In the first 
instance, they provide foundations for review of decisions made. Just the 
knowledge that such a review is possible impels decision makers to self-
control. It requires them to base their decisions, or at least the 
justifications for their decisions, on approved reasons (e.g., the statutory 
requirements) and not on unapproved ones (e.g., bias and prejudice). It 
pushes them toward more careful handling of the materials of decision, the 
fact and law finding, and law applying.  
The judgment also controls the judge. If the judge fails to subsume the 
facts of the case under the applicable law properly, the judge‘s decision is 
subject to correction on appeal. The judgment demonstrates whether the 
judge understood the losing party‘s position; through its impersonal and 
colorless nature, it demonstrates the judge‘s neutrality. 
 
 
 186. In America, the federal court judges are also appointed by elected officials, as opposed to 
elected by the public. 
 187. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 63, at 15–16. 
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The obligations to give reasons for decisions is a general requirement 
of German law. The specifically judicial format is taught to all German 
lawyers.
188
 
Were American trials a common occurrence, they would frequently 
present decision makers with choices that propelled them toward a choice 
between rules and best results. While bringing law and fact together is the 
essence of applying law, American legal methods are based on separating 
law from facts. This is done to allow judges to decide questions of law and 
juries to decide questions of fact. Whether it is for judges or for juries to 
apply law to facts has long been a hotly debated issue.  
Historically, American pleading has sought to steer between the Scylla 
and Charybdis but, instead, has crashed on the rocks of Scylla or been 
swept into the whirlpool of Charybdis. On the one hand, in common law 
pleading, the parties would agree to make a single issue—of fact or of 
law—determinative. As any first year law student knows, rarely is there 
only one issue in dispute. When the parties got it wrong, injustice would 
result. On the other hand, in modern day notice pleading, often the parties 
never get to an issue and the jury—if there is a jury trial—is sent out to 
decide the case. In theory, jurors decide according to law, but no one 
knows in practice since jurors do not explain why they decide as they do. 
Jurors have freedom—greater or lesser depending upon whether the case is 
criminal or civil—to decide as they wish, which may be contrary to law. 
The jury might decide as it thinks best were it not for rules of evidence 
that, as Schauer notes, ―keep even relevant evidence away from a 
frequently distrusted jury.‖189 
In fact, trials have vanished in America. Settlements take into account 
the likely decisions of decision makers, but consider even more important 
the costs of getting there and the risks of worst-case outcomes. The costs 
of getting there can be extraordinarily high, because the inefficiencies of 
American procedure are many, and because control of those procedures 
rests in the hands of the lawyers. American lawyers, unlike the judges who 
control them in Germany, may have no interest in keeping those 
procedures in bounds. The risks of worst-case outcomes is high because 
American laws are uncertain and uncoordinated, decision-makers are 
uncertain and uncoordinated, and most decisions are rendered without 
reasoned explanations. How is one to predict how a case will come out 
when one is unsure which laws apply, one is uncertain which officials will 
 
 
 188. MAXEINER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 226–29. 
 189. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 210. 
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decide, one is unsure what they will be able to decree, but one does know 
that those decisions will be, as jury verdicts and many other legal 
decisions, unexplained?  
Giving reasons does not have the same centrality in present-day 
America as it does in Germany. Imprisoned by the assumption that juries 
decide without giving reasons, Schauer opines that ―[a]t times judges or 
courts do not give reasons because doing so would be inefficient or 
impossible as a practical matter.‖190 In another work, he goes further and 
suggests that ―[p]erhaps at times it is better not to give reasons than to give 
them.‖191  
Schauer argues as he does because of America‘s fixation on appellate 
court decisions as law-making. In giving reasons, Schauer sees a court 
announcing ―what is in effect a rule (or a principle, standard, norm, or 
maxim) more general than the decision itself. To provide a reason in a 
particular case is to transcend the very particularity of that case.‖192 In 
Schauer‘s view, a court in giving a reason in a particular case is 
committing to the reason as a rule in future cases. That is why, he says, 
―we do not always require legal decision makers to give reasons for their 
decisions.‖193 It is also why, however, courts reach the wrong result in the 
real case because of their fear that reaching the right result in that case will 
jeopardize results in future cases.
194
  
In German legal methods, giving reasons is principally an act of law 
application. It is an explanation to the parties why the court decided this 
particular case in the way it did.
195
 It is not an exercise in lawmaking for 
future, hypothetical cases. 
CONCLUSION   
American legal methods often lead to something other than the right 
decision because American law does not clearly establish who is 
responsible for which decision with what consequences. That failing leads 
to Schauer‘s conclusion that ―[r]ather than attempting to reach the best 
result for each controversy in a wholly particularistic and contextual way, 
 
 
 190. Id. at 175. 
 191. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (1995) [hereinafter Schauer, 
Giving Reasons]. 
 192. SCHAUER, supra note 1 at 176–77. 
 193. Id. at 180. 
 194. Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 191, at 655–56. 
 195. See Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law, supra note 36, at 474–75. 
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law‘s goal is often to make sure that the outcome for all or at least most of 
the particulars in a given category is the right one.‖196  
German legal methods provide rules that individuals can follow. They 
assign responsibility for decisions. They allow legislatures to set goals and 
principles and to require procedures and written justifications that frame 
decision makers‘ choices. They do not allow the dead to rule the living. 
They impose boundaries on lawsuits. They provide rules that allow 
decision makers to reach better decisions in particular cases most of the 
time. 
German legal methods as described in Zippelius‘ book could inspire 
American law reform. Indeed, they are already mirrored in much of the 
Start Over initiative of the Common Good organization. The solution of 
the Start Over initiative is to ―Restore Responsibility.‖ It states ―[t]he key 
tests for effective law are whether: 1) regulators have flexibility to make 
sensible choices; 2) there are clear lines of accountability; and 3) 
compliance by those expected to abide by the law is practical.‖197 
 
 
 196. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 8.  
 197. Radically Simplify Law, COMMON GOOD, http://www.commongood.org/pages/radically-
simplify-law (last visited May 2, 2012).  
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